Swaziland in Transition by Larsen Pejstrup, Signe Cecius
 ISSN: 1602-9097 (print) 
ISSN: 1604-7095 (online) 
© 2011 The Interdisciplinary Journal of International Studies 
Swaziland in Transition 
Signe Cecius Larsen Pejstrup 
MSc in Development and International Relations (2011), Aalborg University 
Email: frk_pejstrup@yahoo.dk 
ABSTRACT. The focus of this paper is on the structural and cognitive challenges civil 
society activists meet in their struggle for democracy in the Kingdom of Swaziland. The 
research is motivated by an internship with the Danish labour union federation LO/FTF 
Council and its affiliate in Swaziland, SFTU, while collaborating with grassroots activ-
ists who fight for democracy. The research is based on a survey of 100 Swazis and on 
presentations of two leading democracy activists. The empirical data is contextually ana-
lysed with a range of complementary theories within the social sciences. The analysis 
explains the complexity in the challenges from different approaches both focusing on 
the power of tradition and political modernisation. It is concluded that the challenges are 
related to more than rational issues but rather to a set of cognitive and structural factors 
relating to the power of tradition and the dilemmas in political modernisation. 
Introduction 
Swaziland is a small landlocked country centred in South Africa. It is a dualistic society with 
both a strong traditional nationalistic identity and a modern British influenced identity; rural 
homesteads of stray huts next to shopping malls, or loincloth and axes next to suits. Swaziland 
is formed on one tribe and thereby not divided between different tribes. A sovereign and 
conservative monarch controls the country, but civil society groups and especially the labour 
unions are active in a battle for democracy. There exists an immense amount of academic 
writing on democracy, democratisation, civil society, group theories, and on Africa, but very 
little research has been done specifically on civil society and the underground political 
movements in this tiny monarchy.1 
My interest in delving into these political and nationalistic clashes is based on my internship 
in Swaziland in 2009 with the Danish labour movement federation LO/FTF Council that 
supports unions and democracy projects in developing countries. In Swaziland, I became 
close to strong and charismatic personalities involved in the battle for rights and democracy— 
people who did not want to sacrifice their cultural pride and traditions to follow western 
practices—and in the unions and other civil society groups who fought for the possibility to 
form Swaziland into a nation of strong democratic minds embedded in a strong cultural set-
ting. 
For over two months, I collaborated with Swaziland Labour Union Federation (SFTU) and 
its affiliate Coalition of Informal Economy Associations in Swaziland, an informal workers 
association, to understand their struggle for workers’ rights, basic human needs and for politi-
cal freedom and democracy. To understand the challenges of the unionisation of the informal 
workers, I surveyed 100 informal workers with a questionnaire and the possibility to express 
their views. The results of this research will be presented in the empirical presentation section 
alongside with a presentation from a public meeting I attended in Copenhagen where two 
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leading civil society actors from Swaziland discussed the possibilities of dismantling the 
monarchical system. During my time in Swaziland and fieldtrips around the country I realised 
that there is an active civil society and a will to evolve, collaborate, and make change. The 
underlying conditions for activism are not good, due to the strong, almost dictatorial monar-
chy, and widespread poverty. I was eager to understand the practical and cognitive challenges 
they faced in their struggle for democracy and freedom. 
Central to this research is an exploration and elaboration of the challenges for civil society 
to change the political structure towards multiparty democracy in a politically hostile society; 
split between fixed traditional mind-sets and those aspiring for some dispensation of democ-
racy. Its focus is on civil society actors and the people at the grassroots level in Swaziland 
since it is their lives that are being affected. What interests and puzzles me are the challenges 
that impede civil society in the process of democratisation and how civil society contributes to 
this process. 
The main focus of the research is not to find a clear solution for Swaziland, but rather to 
illuminate the diversity of challenges they face as they aspire to become agents of democratic 
change. The obvious obstacles such as police violence, legislation, and bad governance are 
tangible and may be possible to change with support from the international community. Such 
actions directed against the monarchy and the government would indicate a top-down ap-
proach. But there are several underlying layers of the challenges that cannot be overcome 
immediately using a top-down process, but rather need to be handled from the bottom-up via 
empowerment projects, debates, and inclusions in the population in the rural areas via civil 
society. 
The paper briefly presents the country, then considerations on the research and a presenta-
tion of the empirical data, followed by a deeper reflection and analysis of the topic. The 
analysis is divided into four main sections. The first is about how important are effective and 
strong organisations to mobilisation for change. The second is an examination of how legiti-
macy of the King is important for the power structures. The third explores how change of 
mentality and democratic awareness is based on structures of social and individual identities. 
And the fourth covers how the elements of national identity, tradition, and cognitive structures 
have a strong position in social changes. The paper concludes with a summary and makes 
some points for reflection. 
Swaziland, a Monarchy 
Few people around the world have heard about Swaziland, as it is a peaceful monarchy with 
only 1.1 million inhabitants landlocked in South Africa. But the country holds a few notable 
world records. Besides Sibebe, the second biggest rock of the world, Swaziland has the 
world’s highest HIV rate at around 40%, with a life expectancy at 32 years and it is the last 
absolute monarchy in the world. In addition, a unionist has been allegedly killed in police 
custody for wearing a t-shirt with the logo of a political party on it. Since my visit to Swazi-
land there have been continuously more human rights violations and civil discontent is 
mounting. This is an example of why light needs to be shed on Swaziland. 
Swazis are proud nationalistic tribal people who find community spirit in their narrative on 
culture and traditions. As indicated, Swaziland has a vibrant and outspoken civil society that 
demands reforms for rights and democracy, although through different means and political 
ideologies (Mzizi 2002; ACTSA 2008; Word Food Programme and Hershey 2009). Besides 
the political system and repression the monarch is criticised for extravagant use of money, 
while 70% live in abject poverty. The King has 13 wives as part of the traditional way of 
living and as part of the western way of life he feels it is necessary to have a jet plane when 
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they need to go shopping in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the small country spends a lot on 
their military (Mzizi 2002).  
The country was under the rule of the British Commission, 1906-1968, and has thereafter 
adopted element of the Westminster Model, which is now combined with a system of chief-
dom called Tinklundha. The system holds democratic elements but King Mswati III is the sole 
ruler. The political unrest started in the 1980s when the former King died, it was seen as a 
chance for change, but instead it became a strengthening of the monarchy. During the same 
period, other African countries started experiencing battles against dictatorial systems, includ-
ing apartheid in South Africa (Mzizi 2002). 
Political parties are banned and are categorised as terrorist entities, although a few still exist. 
Because of these restrictions, political groups are politically active in worker unions that are 
legal; however, political and democratic forces are often limited in the worker union as well. 
An example of this would be that just before a legal demonstration in September, 40 to around 
a hundred unionists were brutally arrested for no apparent reason (Livbjerg 2010). This shows 
the limited space unions have for manoeuvring. The majority of the active civil society groups 
call for multi-party democracy, and 60-65% of the workforce are unionised, most in the po-
litical unions of SFTU and SFL (Mzizi 2005). The rural and informal workers (e.g., street 
vendors, craftsmen, traditional healers and small-scale farmers), most often women, are the 
less unionised groups, and due to the global economic crises in the late 2000s the number of 
informal workers is growing. These groups are in these years getting unionised by CIEAS, an 
affiliate to SFTU, with whom I collaborated about parts of the research during the practicum. 
The organisation is constitutionally apolitical, nevertheless it is still unionising this big group 
of civil society. 
Other groups are formed to unite the active civil society to form a united front. Swaziland 
United Democratic Front (SUDF) is a recently formed collective advocacy movement aiming 
to bring together different parts of civil society including both major radical movements but 
also more conservative fragments within political parties, unions, and churches. Their goal is 
to have a united front in the struggle for multi-party democracy. Foundation of Socio-
Economic Justice (FSEJ) started in 2003 and concentrates on civic education to encourage 
participation and to raise awareness on human rights issues and democracy. The biggest de-
mocratic initiative is Swaziland Democracy Campaign (SDC). Statements from 
representatives of the leadership of FSEJ and SUDF are part of the empirical data (FSEJ and 
SUDF Activists 2010; Mzizi 2002). 
Considerations on Methodology  
The research is aimed not to be normative, however it cannot be assumed to be objective 
either. My involvement with the activists and the local community, as well as my personal 
background has coloured my view. Ontologically, the approach is based on the perception that 
social phenomena are created and viewed through human understandings and attitudes. Clif-
ford Geertz (1993) has, on the basis of Gilbert Ryle, formulated the concept ‘thick 
description’. It explains that objectivity is not possible (or desirable) when observing and 
understanding actions or phenomena. Thus, I will not avoid, but rather accept and embrace 
my own conceptual structures as a point of departure. The data collection is directly from the 
source, but it is still somehow a product of my interpretation based on my background. Multi-
ple types of empirical data, theories, and analysis methods are included to avoid one-
sidedness and to acknowledge most possible viewpoints and approaches. 
It should be noted that the empirical data is not representative sample of the country, but 
rather it is a survey undertaken among informal workers. In that way, the survey results 
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should be understood as a presentation of some views and an indication of ideas and not as 
exact presentation of the Swazis’ general mind-set. It would, however, be really interesting to 
undertake a general and more in-depth investigation to enlighten and understand the mind-set 
of the Swazis. 
Two of the central concepts in the paper are democracy and civil society, both terms with 
multiple definitions. The word democracy in this context is understood as a version of a mul-
tiparty system where basic rights such as the right to assembly are fulfilled.2 Exactly what 
political version and how the political structures should look like are not discussed fully here. 
The definition that is used builds on a relatively unequivocal although not thorough definition 
of democracy expressed by the activists. The definition used is therefore a multiparty system 
with the King as cultural figure without any political power, and as a democratic mind-set of 
the masses (FSEJ and SUDF Activists 2010).  
Civil society is another term with several definitions. It is the pathway between the individ-
ual citizens and politics and it covers the organisations formed by citizens as a participatory 
practice. In this research the focus is on groups related to political struggles, but civil society 
also includes: religious groups, more practical-related groups such as cooperatives, or other 
non-political NGOs. Civil society also includes less organised entities as it include all civil 
parts of the society. In Swaziland, it is the labour union federations who are key actors on the 
civil society scene. Civil society does not fully represent the population, as some social 
groups are more engaged and active than others. This is apparent in Swaziland where it is 
dangerous to be politically engaged and where scarce resources in rural areas limit the level of 
participation. Nonetheless, as the empirical data will show, also the rural areas in Swaziland 
are getting more and more organised and active. 
Empirical Foundations – the Swazis’ Statements 
Two types of independently collected empirical data are fundamental to the exploration of 
challenges to democratisation. The first is a survey undertaken in 2009 among 100 informal 
economy workers from around the country, some organised and some not (Pejstrup 2010). 
The questionnaires were formulated with around 25 questions on organisation, hopes, and 
democracy. The answers were not pre-formulated but the participants expressed themselves in 
their own words. As shown below, the answers were then analysed and collected into groups 
of replies to be able to make an overview. 
The survey showed that the associations the workers are organised are often small and 
mainly formed for practical reasons in connection with vending, transportation, or collabora-
tions in building a poultry farm. Some are slightly political in the sense that they, for example, 
come together to formulate petitions about the market place for the city council.3 However, 
the associations are democratic arenas where Swazis from rural areas also have knowledge 
sharing and debate. The questions reflected different aspects of their lives—for example, on 
whether the workers were optimistic about their associations, they gave a series of good ideas 
for development of CIEAS and SFTU. The responses of key relevance for this paper are the 
ones relating to SFTU and democracy. The responses and lack of the same on the questions 
on SFTU and democracy provides data on how the Swazi population thinks of democracy (the 
full survey results and reflections can be found in my master’s thesis, Pejstrup 2010). The 
prevailing majority was positive about SFTU. Few responded to the more forward question 
about the sensible subject of democracy, but only one out of 100 said that he disliked democ-
racy (see Figure 1) and the answers about how it should be reached reflected a high degree of 
willingness for communication (see Figure 2). The results are shown in the figures below. 
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Figure 1 
“Do you wish Swaziland was more democratic? (Please elaborate on your answer.)” 
 
 
N:100 
(Source: Pejstrup 2010) 
 
Figure 2 
“If yes, how could it be achieved?” 
 
 
N:100 
(Source: Pejstrup 2010) 
 
It is not certain what the lack of answers could signify. Most likely it is a sign of the Swazis 
being insecure or afraid of debating democracy. It is unclear for them what it includes and 
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what it will result in. Furthermore, it would possibly be problematic for them to answer these 
questions openly. 
The second part of the empirical data features recordings from a meeting held in Denmark 
with two leading civil society activists. It was arranged by the Danish NGO Africa Contact 
and held in March 2010 with the title “How to remove a despot?” The guests and speakers 
were: representatives from Swaziland Federation of Labour (SFL), SUDF, SFTU, and FSEJ 
(for a summary of the meeting, see Pejstrup 2010).4 The whole meeting forms the basis for the 
analysis of the challenges. 
The activists started their presentation by describing the problems they meet, especially in 
the rural areas that are controlled by chiefs and thereby indirectly by the King. However, the 
organisations have had success in civil rights education. They hope to make Swaziland look 
united so the international actors can see they wish democracy and can get help to change the 
situation.  They are afraid it will look like the violent situation in Zimbabwe before they can 
get help from outside. Both activists have experienced being abducted or harassed in various 
ways by the police, even though the organisations are legal. Together with the lack of free-
dom, rights, and democracy, the activists are worried about the highly unequal income 
distribution. Moreover, they are explaining the role of women, as women are not treated as 
legal persons with, for example, the right to own land. However, women do come together to 
fight for their rights. Regarding the political system the activists explain that they hope for 
Swaziland to develop a multiparty system. It should not be an import from foreign countries, 
as they wish for a constitutional monarchy where the King is a national symbol without inter-
fering in political issues.  
Civic education, debates, and empowerment that are conducted on grass roots level are of 
key relevance for development, as they acknowledge that international restrictions cannot be 
used unless the Swazis speak with one voice. Since the transition process can be done in 
multiple ways and worked on several angles, civil society activists benefit from collaboration 
with, among others, Africa Contact, and the SFTU benefits from LO/FTF council, which 
supports workers rights as well as workshops with debates. 
The two sets of empirical research reflected two sides of the civil society and used a method 
of triangulation. One of the key elements in both sets of materials is the strong will to be 
organised despite harsh conditions. To fight for democracy takes a lot of courage and re-
sources, but even in the rural areas there is willingness to organisation and optimism about 
participation. 
The Complexity of Transition 
I will go further into the challenges on civil society that impede the process of democratisa-
tion in Swaziland and how they contribute to the following section. In order to explore these 
challenges, a range of complementary theoretical approaches is incorporated in the analysis 
on the democratisation and civil society of Swaziland. The theories chosen address the issues 
relating to the power of tradition and the issues of political modernisation. They are comple-
mentary as important element of the path towards the conclusion and will be used to address 
various dimensions of the empirical data. The analysis is divided into sections according to 
the issues considered and the theories and the empirical data will be employed in the analyti-
cal arguments. 
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The Issue of a Strong Social Movement 
A political shift and a change towards a democratic oriented national mind beginning from the 
grassroots level can only be achieved with a strong movement. Results from both the survey 
and the activists showed that communication and unity were urgent needs to achieve the goal 
and hence well-functioning representational organisations are a key element (Pejstrup 2010). 
Charles Tilly’s framework of social movements focuses on the components of social move-
ments and it can thereby support the examination of the challenges social movements 
encounter. He explains that a strong social movement includes a sustained collective claim, a 
repertoire of actions, and what he calls the WUNC displays (Worthiness, Unity, Numbers, 
Commitment) (see Tilly 1978; Tilly and Wood 2009). The first element is for the organisation 
or movement to have a sustained collective claim that extends beyond a single event. In Swa-
ziland. the common campaign among most social movements is the desire for multiparty 
democracy and implementation of human rights. However, the strongest entities are based on 
the labour movements whose main focus is labour rights, which is more a practical element 
than a problem as civil society groups are organised in different fields and they need to stay 
legal to survive. The main campaign is divided into a repertoire of several actions, and the 
different movements have both their own and the collective ones. Despite the danger, partici-
pants of the social movements keep writing petitions, organise meetings, strikes and 
demonstrations. As the representative from FSEJ explained, their activities are related to civic 
education, discussions and empowerment projects that match the requests of the informal 
economy workers in the survey in order to achieve democratic development. The lack of open 
rallies and hence the possibility to declare or promote their positions to the general public give 
significant challenges for the mobilisation in social movements (FSEJ and SUDF Activists 
2010; Tilly 1978; Tilly and Wood 2009).  
According to Tilly (1978), there are four additional elements that are relevant for a social 
movement as illustrated in the WUNC displays (see also Tilly and Wood 2009). The first 
display is Worthiness, which suggests the necessity in presentation, particularly in a case 
where the national discourse portrays all political activists as terrorists. It is of key relevance 
for the social movements to show they are non-violent and that they are supported by all types 
of people and not just a minority group of extremists. Secondly, as the empirical data indicate, 
Unity is a key element for success. It is a challenge to avoid conflicts or disunity, but the civil 
society actors are working with the issue by shaping all-embracing organisations such as the 
SUDF. Unity is emphasised by symbols and actions, several of which relate to the struggle 
against apartheid like ‘Amandla! Awethu!’, which means ‘Power! To the people!’. The third 
display is Numbers, which indicates that the movements can show support since a well-
supported group gains more support. In the Swazi case, this becomes a challenge as the cause 
might have a lot more or maybe less support than what is shown publicly because of the 
danger of arrest in participation. The last display in Tilly’s terminology of social movement is 
Commitment. This element reflects the challenges as it takes a high degree of commitment to 
be an active participant because of the risk of harassments and arrests.  Even answering the 
questions on democracy in the anonymous survey was transcendent and only a quarter or a 
third did so. 
It takes an extraordinary amount of commitment to fulfil the role of a movement that can 
change the political structure and to a certain extent the national identity of Swaziland. In 
conclusion, Swaziland is far from living up to the standards that Tilly presents but some good 
groundwork have been built and steps taken. Max Weber’s theoretical framework on legiti-
macy will in the following section be used in the analysis of how the King still has legitimacy 
despite a broadly based wish for democracy. 
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The Issue of the King’s Legitimacy 
It is clear that King Mswati III’s legitimacy to rule is based on aspects other than just his 
political and economic abilities. Obviously, rational fear for going against the King is of big 
importance to Mswati’s supremacy. Max Weber’s theory on power relations is a classic way 
of explaining legitimacy and domination. The three archetypes of legitimacy are tradition, 
charisma, and legal domination, and each will be used to analyse the power relations and the 
role of the King (Weber 1978 [1991]; see also Gerth and Wright Mills 1991). 
Legitimacy based on tradition has undoubtedly been a key factor as to why the monarchy in 
Swaziland holds power. While the world around the Swazis changes, the monarchy and its 
supporters rely heavily on the tradition, nationalism, and the history and national identity of 
the Swazis. Traditional power structures, ceremonies, rites and even clothing are important 
factors in the nation-building process. It is in the favour of the monarchy that the national 
identity continues to be built on traditions more than processes of modernisation or westerni-
sation. Although it interesting to note that the system in its current version is no more than a 
few generations old, it is formed around a romanticised historic narrative from pre-colonial 
times. The calculated use of discourse and narrative and invented traditions will be analysed 
later. Respect for Mswati is not, at least not entirely, based on manipulations and ignorance as 
the King is a symbol of independence and national pride. A rapid change of institutions, 
structures, and symbols would most probably cause unrest. My own observations including 
Kuper’s and Booth’s research suggest a nation in political transition, but combined with a 
strong sense of belonging and proud culture (Kuper 1947, 1972; Booth 1983, 2000). Even if 
activists believe in democratic developments, only the most progressives believe that the King 
should be removed entirely. In casual conversations, several Swazis have expressed curiosity 
with the Danish governmental system of constitutional monarchy. 
Charisma is another explanation for the existing power structures. A strong superhuman and 
heroic narrative supports the charismatic legitimacy of the King. Most of this narrative is 
actually shaped by the former King and not by the present. However, Mswati III keeps it alive 
and the narrative sticks to the institution. King Mswati III is an icon and it is rather the system 
that is criticised more than the person. However, a strong spearhead is a valuable means for 
any organisation to connect to and formulate the identity of the organisation (Weber 2005). 
These three aspects illustrate some of the basic reasons about the challenges facing the advo-
cates for transition. 
The Issue of Social Identity and Self-categorisation 
The works of Clifford Geertz, Stuart Hall, and Fredrik Barth are adopted for analysing issues 
related to identity, culture, and the narrative perspective (Geertz 1993; Hall and du Gay 1996; 
Barth 1969). Geertz defines culture in this manner: 
[M]an is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself spun, I take culture to be those 
webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an in-
terpretative one in search of meaning. (Geertz 1993: 11) 
The idea that one is suspended in a web of significance is a key point in the analysis and 
conclusion of this paper. Hall’s (1996) version of a similar thought is that identities and iden-
tifications are constructed as reflections of one’s surroundings and are always in process due 
to radical historisation. The constitutive outside both shapes and sketches the differences to 
the identity of an entity so they are marked and clear and the borders formulate the identity of 
the group (Hall 1996). Fredrik Barth explains that boundaries create identification and thereby 
that the dichotomisation of others as strangers implies internal common understanding and 
mutual interest (Barth 1969). 
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Michael A. Hogg and Deborah J. Terry have a more complex theory on social identities and 
self-categorisation processes (Hogg and Terry 2000). The theory is included to understand 
cognitive identity and social action in organisations. The main points are:  
(1) social identity processes are motivated by subjective uncertainty reduction, (2) prototype-
based de-personalization lies at the heart of social identity processes, and (3) groups are inter-
nally structured in terms of perceived or actual group prototypicality of members. (Hogg and 
Terry 2000: 122) 
The theory of Hogg and Terry on self-categorisation combined with Hall’s and Barth’s 
thoughts on social identity can be adopted in order to explain some of the complexities in 
social identification and why national, social, and individual identity has such a big impact on 
the struggle for democracy in Swaziland. 
Even though both traditionalists and the activists are proud Swazis, there lies a battle in the 
formulation of the national identity as well as the societal structures. As social identity proc-
esses are motivated by subjective uncertainty reduction, it is thus the goal for progressive 
social movements to develop a strong united identity. The risk is that increased subjective 
uncertainty among the population makes them stick to the safe and well-known prototypical 
traditional Swaziness. A new societal and political system therefore has to involve a strong 
social identity that reduce uncertainty and rather develop unity and a common Swazi national 
feeling that is not deviant, strange, or un-Swazi for the individuals. According to the termi-
nology it is a prototype-based de-personalisation that happens when one enters a group and 
adopts to it according to the mainstream idea of such a group. His personal will is not erased, 
but the risk of deviance and alienation keeps him consciously or unconsciously close to the 
prototypical group member, in this case the traditional Swazi. People are in general rather 
path dependent and follow the group’s identity (Hogg and Terry 2000). 
Some people come together and ‘deviate’ from the traditional structures collectively in un-
ions and movements. A single person who brings changes or new ideas to a group becomes a 
vulnerable outcast, but as soon the individuals mould a group with their own prototypes, 
ideals, and identity the group will be alienated from the other group and together they have a 
social identity that forms them as a new cohesive group. The group has to shape a social 
identity that speaks for its members but at the same time a social identity that separates them 
from other groups. Unity reduces subjective uncertainty, and it makes one feel safe and makes 
one belong to a strong social identity. The challenge is to formulate a prototype that clearly 
separates them from the traditionalist but on the other hand does not demand a change too 
large between the identity as a proud nationalist Swazi and the identity as a democratic Swazi 
(Hogg and Terry 2000). Identity is a significant issue and even if it is changeable it changes 
slowly and according to its surroundings and its circumstances, as the self-perception and 
group identity is significant for people’s actions and mind-sets. The change that is needed for 
democratic development and modernisation is therefore difficult to move. The democratic is 
not just a matter of political arguments, but also especially a matter of identity. The challenge 
in reformulating such issues is extensive but possible to overcome; however, it demands lot of 
time and work at the grassroots level. 
The Issue of National Identity  
This section has four parts that collectively indicate how personal and social identity and a 
national narrative strongly affect individuals’ viewpoints and group mentality. 
To execute democracy one needs not only to understand the premises but also to accept 
them as part of one’s culture and national identity. Nevertheless, for many Swazis the political 
debate seems irrelevant and intangible, but the FSEJ and SUDF representatives argue that the 
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wish for democracy exists, but it needs to be found explicitly via empowerment projects 
(FSEJ and SUDF Activists 2010). The point about democracy is actually not political unity, 
as this removes the necessary individuality of the democratic process. Instead, empowerment 
is needed in order to facilitate people into formulating their own stance and thereby claim 
their democratic rights. The unity lies in the common goal of a democratic system that paves 
the way for such mentalities and strengthened individualistic mind-sets. The social identity of 
being a Swazi has tremendous importance and since that includes monarchical features it 
takes more than good political arguments for the Swazi on the ground to change the percep-
tion of their group identity as Swazis. 
Considering Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s (2010) concept ‘invented tradition’, 
which refers to those traditions that are invented either intentionally or unconsciously as a 
response to a situation where the power of tradition is useful, we can understand how Swazi 
traditions are mobilised in the process of nation-building such as in the formulation of collec-
tive memory and national narratives. 
Traditions are important elements of an identification process, both for the traditionalists 
and in the civil society. When naturally occurring traditions are not enough, traditions get 
invented. This often occurs during periods of rapid change, as people feel the need to a refer-
ence point in their lives. Thereby, it is also an effective means in the nation-building process, 
or in this case, in struggles over national identities. Invented traditions and narratives have a 
deep impact on identification, and even though the monarchy is no older than 70 years, it has 
positioned itself as a valuable piece of history. The monarchy has developed a range of tradi-
tions with a high degree of symbolic value, and going against any of these is symbolically 
equalised with support to the British colonial powers or other rootless and un-Swazi values. 
The other party and civil society actors also use invented traditions as a rallying cry and sym-
bol of freedom in South Africa against apartheid (Hobsbawm and Ranger 2010). 
The struggle on the national identity—democratic vs. conservative—is to a large extent 
fought discursively. Discursive acts can contribute to the restoration and legitimisation of the 
social status quo, as well as its destruction and transformation (Wodak, De Cillia, Reisigl and 
Liebhart 2009). The monarchy has had success in controlling the discourse and the national 
narrative to such an extent that it has been able to set a scene that is hard to change. That is of 
course emphasised by, among others, the control of the media. The current political system 
was formulated in a period when the border between nationalism and the colonial power was 
highly important to the construction of a national identity in which all structures and symbols 
that were Swazi—rather than British—were embraced. It has been an emphasised alienation 
of the British and this alienation has grown to include democratic ideas like westernisation. 
Barth (1969) explains such a process as ‘a dichotomisation of others like strangers’, which is 
an extremely strong social and psychological means in the discussion of group mentality. 
These sections have shown that the challenges the civil society actors meet are more pro-
found and complex than can be addressed by a single solution. However, civil society actors 
acknowledge these difficulties and try to deal with them despite limited resources and a bun-
dle of hurdles. 
Conclusion 
This paper has explored the different challenges that confront civil society to play a role in the 
process of democratisation in Swaziland. The civil society is an active actor in reaching this 
democratisation goal, and the objective of this paper has been to examine what are the main 
challenges facing them and thereby how can democracy advocates succeed. The method of 
triangulation in data collection, in theory, and in method of analysis has been applied to get 
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the most nuanced research possible. The survey of 100 informal workers, mainly rural poverty 
stricken women, is an indication of their situation and their relation with social movement 
activities and democratisation.  
I attended and recorded a meeting with two main actors in the democratisation process to 
reflect the other side of civil society and to get direct information on views, ideas, and the 
work. The data has been analysed with a variety of theoretical frameworks that with different 
approaches investigated challenges for the democratisation process. The challenges can be 
partly explained as due to the power of tradition and political modernisation.  
Four main issues were discovered. The first investigated the well-functioning civil society 
groups, or social movements. It was pointed out that social movements need a common cam-
paign with the Swazi organisations as they have set a joint goal of multiparty system. They 
need a repertoire of actions, and they need worthiness, unity, numbers of people that support 
them, and commitment—all elements that the organisations are aware of, but remain chal-
lenges due to current and historical circumstances. 
The second main issue is the relatively high degree of legitimacy the King has. It was exam-
ined why this is the case through the sociological theory of Max Weber on the sources of 
power and legitimacy. There are three types of legitimacy: a rational one that is strong due to 
the King’s supremacy; a traditional form that is strong in this case due to conservatism and 
nationalism; and a charismatic form that reflects the superhuman icon the King has become. 
The third part dealt with social identity and self-categorisation, and it illustrated the im-
mense importance of individual’s identity and sense of belonging. The development of 
democracy is more than the structure of the government but also a cognitive acknowledge-
ment of participation and individual thinking and collective collaboration. This means that the 
civil society actors stand in front of a challenge of reformulating what Swaziness is. 
The fourth part of the article took these ideas on identity from a personal to a national level: 
firstly, it discussed issues of democratic identities in a traditional society; and secondly, it 
examined the meaning of invented traditions, narratives, and discursive battles. 
In conclusion, the challenges on the democratisation process and how they can be overcome 
by civil society are manifold. The dilemma of the discussion involves issues in the power of 
tradition versus political modernisation. To realise democracy, institutions have to change and 
the power structure needs to be redefined. Here, a fundamental issue has to do with questions 
of national identity and democratic mind-sets. The concepts of democracy, identity, and na-
tionalism are cognitive and social constructions. Neither of them are tangible issues, nor the 
way for democratic progressives to succeed is to balance between tradition and Swazi unique-
ness and pride, on the one hand, and political modernisation and democracy, on the other. A 
possible revolutionary change in Swaziland that throws away all unity would scatter the Swa-
zis and rebound on the process for democracy. The research showed a desire among the 
surveyed Swazis and the activists for openness, organisation, communication, freedom, and 
democracy. There is still a long way to go for the development of a sincere democracy in 
Swaziland, and it will be interesting to follow future developments and the transition that is 
ongoing among the people. 
Two big issues of debate are relevant to investigate in further research of the transition of 
Swaziland. Firstly, this research has not dealt with the type of democracy Swaziland needs 
and it is of big importance that it is not assumed that any copy of a democratic form of gov-
ernance will fit Swaziland. And secondly, the political activists who visited Copenhagen feel 
that it is urgent for the international community to take action. However, they wish for inter-
national involvement is constrained by the risk of an eventual western top-down political 
modernisation, which will foster new conflicts. 
It is therefore a challenge for the social movements to encourage a political change, as the 
international society is not in a position to interfere in national issues. The debate is worth 
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taking, as the situation in Swaziland is indefensible, but a bottom-up solution is to a large 
extent preferable. Further investigation on this issue is necessary. 
Notes 
1. The main social science authors on Swaziland are Hilda Kuper and Alan R. Booth. Joshua Bheki Mzizi 
also researches on specific topics in the Swazi context. 
2. These are basic rights according to the UN Human Rights agreement. 
3. Some of the associations were members of CIEAS, while others are not. CIEAS functions as a coalition 
of several groups and it has few individuals as members. 
4. Names are not identified here for purposes of security. 
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